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ABSTRACT 
The widespread adoption of web services as an instant means of information dissem-
ination and various other transactions, including those having financial consequences, 
have essentially made them a key component of today's Internet infrastructure. Un-
derneath the infrastructure, relational database plays an important role, in a sense, as 
organizing data and making the retrieval and insertion of the data in a efficient and 
secure fashion. Structured Query Language(SQL) is designed to query data contained 
in a relational database. SQL is important as it is the only way for a user to interact 
with a relational database. But few focus has been put on SQL because people consider 
SQL as a simple language. But in fact, SQL legacy code repository could be as huge 
as some mainstream languages such as C, Java etc. In this paper, we focus on SQL 
Injection Attacks and SQL Code Coverage. 
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CHAPTER 1. Preventing SQL Injection Attack 
An SQL injection attack targets interactive web applications that employ database 
services. These applications accept user inputs and use them to form SQL statements 
at runtime. During an SQL injection attack, an attacker might provide malicious SQL 
query segments as user input which could result in a different database request. By 
using SQL injection attacks, an attacker could thus obtain and/or modify confiden-
tial/sensitive information. An attacker could even use a SQL injection vulnerability as 
a rudimentary IP/Port scanner of the internal corporate network. Various organizations 
have started extensively deploying Intrusion Detection/Prevention Systems (IDS/IPS) 
and Firewalls as a means of securing their vital installations against unauthorized ac-
cess. However, very little emphasis is laid on securing the applications that run on these 
systems, apart from frequent updates and patching. SQL-Injection Attacks are a class 
of attacks that many of these systems are highly vulnerable to, and there is no known 
fool-proof defense against such attacks. The vulnerability of the entire network as a 
result of such attacks is at best understated. We noticed that SQL-Injection Attacks is 
committed by using dynamic SQL, and it could happen either in Application level such 
as a Java user program or a stored procedure in SQL Server. We gave a novel technique 
to prevent SQL Injection Attack in either aspect by combining static application code 
analysis with runtime validation to eliminate the occurrence of such attacks. The deploy-
ment of this technique as a minor modification to the existing architecture, eliminates 
the need to modify the source code of various application scripts, additionally allowing 
seamless integration with currently-deployed systems. We also provide certain enhanced 
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features and preliminary evaluation results of the prototype we have developed, as tested 
on various representative web applications and stored procedures. 
1.1 Introduction 
The World Wide Web has experienced remarkable growth in recent years. Businesses, 
individuals and governments have found that web applications can offer effective, efficient 
and reliable solutions to the challenges of communicating and conducting commerce in 
the 21th century. Various corporate bodies whose business model completely focuses 
on the Web like eBay, Google, Yahoo, Amazon etc. have taken Web interactions to 
newer heights. As more and more enterprise applications dealing with sensitive financial 
and medical data turn online, the security of such Web applications has come under 
close scrutiny. Compromise of these applications represents a serious threat to the 
organizations that have deployed these web applications as well as to the users that 
trust these systems to store confidential data. The potential downtime and damages 
that could easily amount to millions of dollars have also prohibited many mission critical 
applications, which could greatly benefit the users, from going online. Hence, it is crucial 
to protect these applications from targeted attacks. 
However, the current state of application security leaves much to be desired. The 
2002 Computer Security Institute and FBI revealed that, on a yearly basis, over half of 
all databases experience at least one security breach and an average episode results in 
close to ~4 million in losses [19] . A recent penetration testing study performed by the 
Imperva Application Defense Center included more than 250 Web applications from e-
commerce, online banking, enterprise collaboration and supply chain management sites 
and their vulnerability assessment concluded that at least 92°-/0 of Web applications are 
vulnerable to some form of malicious intrusions [22]. Recent U.S. industry regulations 
such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act pertaining to information security, try to enforce strict 
3 
security compliance by application vendors [21] and there is an urgent need to find means 
of satisfying these security requirements. 
SQL-Injection Attacks (SQLIAs) constitute an important class of attacks against 
web applications. SQLIAs can give attackers direct access to the database underlying 
an application and allow them to leak alter confidential, or even sensitive, information. 
There are many examples of SQLIAs with serious consequences, and the list of victims 
includes high-profile companies and associations, such as Travelocity, FTD.com, Tower 
Records, RIAA etc. [20] . The increasing number of web applications falling prey to these 
attacks is alarmingly high [23] [24]. In fact, SQLIAs have been included in the list of 
top 10 security threats to web applications [28] . 
An even more disturbing trend has been the inability of traditional defense strategies 
such as firewalls, deep packet inspection, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) etc. to 
protect against such attacks. These attacks can be executed in multiple different ways 
that enable the attacker to read all data on that system or even execute any malicious 
code on that system [25] . An attacker can easily leverage this to create a large number 
of zombie machines. Additionally when cleverly used, it can be used to map the internal 
network of an organization, including running IP address space scanning, port scanning 
etc. [14]. Every possible network-based attack can be piggybacked on this attack and 
it would serve as an efficient, untraceable carrier or attack agent. Thus it is not only 
essential to safeguard the perimeter of one's network, but also to plug all the holes in 
the softwares that run within the internal network. 
SQL-Injection Attacks is basically caused by dynamic SQL which is a way to allow 
user to build different SQL statements as a string according to different requirements. 
A dynamically built SQL statement is unknown until runtime. With different user 
inputs or under different conditions, the SQL statement can be different. Dynamic SQL 
offers flexibility and reduced code complexity for developers, but at the same time it 
potentially suffers SQL-Injection Attacks. SQL-Injection Attacks could be committed 
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by sending SQL statement through JDBC or Ado.net in application level or by calling 
stored procedure which is underlying a relational database. 
JDBC(Java Database Connectivity) and Ado.net(ActiveX Data Objects) are API 
that define how a client application may access a relational database. It provides meth-
ods to query and update data in a relational database. A result set will be returned 
if a query is issued. JDBC is for Java programming language, and it comes with Java 
Platform, Standard Edition which includes the JDBC API together with an ODBC 
implementation of the API enabling connections to any relational database that sup-
ports ODBC. Ado.net is a similar relational data access model for Microsoft.NET-based 
applications. It may be used to access data sources for which there is a specific .NET 
Provider, or, via a .NET Bridge Provider, for which there is a specific OLE DB Provider, 
ODBC Driver, or JDBC Driver. In our paper, we will choose JDBC as our experiment 
environment. 
Stored procedures are an important part of modern-day relational database. They 
add an extra layer of abstraction into the design of a software system, which means 
that, as long as the interface on the stored procedure stays the same, the underlying 
table structure could change with no noticeable consequence to the application that is 
using the database. This extra layer, to some extent, hides some design secrets from the 
potentially malicious users, such as definitions of tables. By using stored procedure, one 
could make sure all the data is always contained in the database and is never exposed. 
Most of the current-day databases, including Oracle, DB2, SQL Server, etc. support 
functions and~or stored procedures. For example, in SQL Server, EXEC(varchar(n) 
@SQL) could execute arbitrary SQL statements. This feature offers flexibility to con-
struct SQL statements according to different requirements, but faces a potential threat 
from SQLIAs. 
Herein, we propose a novel technique to detect SQLIAs in stored procedures and Java 
applications. Our technique builds upon a combination of static and dynamic analyses 
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techniques. The key intuition behind our technique is that a SQLIA will alter the struc-
ture of the original SQL statement and by detecting the difference in the structures, a 
SQLIA can be identified. Our technique consists of two phases. In the oflline phase, 
the technique uses a parser to pre-process and identify select stored procedures for run-
time analysis. In the runtime phase, the technique monitors all dynamically-generated 
SQL-queries associated with user input and captures the original structure of the SQL 
statement and checks for compliance after inclusion of the user inputs. When a SQLIA 
is detected, the technique prevents the malicious SQL statements from accessing the 
database, and provides details on the characteristics of the attack. In the application 
level, our technique eliminates the requirement of modification of application source code 
and change of current system architecture. 
In addition to describing the structure of our technique, we also present a preliminary 
evaluation of the proposed technique. We built a prototype SQLIA defense tool for 
Microsoft SQL Server 2005, and use it to evaluate our technique on a sample database 
in SQL Server. The results show that our technique is effective and involves negligible 
runtime overhead, and functions completely transparent to the developer. 
1.2 SQL-Injection 
In this section, we will show how attacker could exploit this vulnerability in Java 
application and stored procedure. 
1.2.1 SQL-Injection in Java Application 
In this section, we present a web application that is vulnerable to a SQLIA and ex-
plain how an attacker could exploit this vulnerability. We also present various advanced 
techniques that can be employed to gain illegitimate access to the system as well as the 
network resources. 
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Consider a typical web application in which an user on a client machine can access 
services provided by a web server, having a database backend, like an online email ac-
count. When the user enters a login and a password in the web form and presses the 
Submit button, an UI~,L is generated (http://foo.com/home.jsp?login=guest&pass=test) and Sent 
to the web server. The user input is interpreted by the servlet home.jsp, which then 
in turn builds a dynamic SQL query, submits the query to the database and uses the 
response from the database to generate HTML-pages that are sent back to the user. 
Suppose the query in the servlet page is of the form; 
SELECT PROFILE FROM EMPLOYEE WHERE NAME='$login' AND PASS='$pass' 
If the login and password as provided by the user are used, the query to be submitted 
to the database takes the form; 
SELECT PROFILE FROM EMPLOYEE WHERE NAME='guest' AND PASS='test' 
A web site that uses this servlet would be vulnerable to SQLIAs. If the user were to 
enter [' OR 1=1 --] and [ ] instead of [guest] and [test], the query would take the form; 
SELECT PROFILE FROM EMPLOYEE WHERE NAME=' ' OR 1=1 --' AND PASS=' ' 
The characters "— — " mark the beginning of a comment in SQL, and everything 
after that is ignored. The query as interpreted by the database now has a tautology 
and hence will always be satisfied, and the database would return information about 
all users. Thus an attacker can bypass all authentication modules in place and gain 
unrestricted access to critical information on the web server. 
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1.2.2 SQL-Injection in Stored Procedures 
A stored procedure is an operation set that is stored. Typically, stored procedures are 
written in SQL. Since stored procedures are stored on the server side, they are available 
to all clients. Once the stored procedure is modified, all clients automatically get the 
new version. 
1. CREATE PROCEDURE [EMP].[RetrieveProfile] @Name varchar(50), @Passwd varchar(50) 
2. WITH EXECUTE AS CALLER 
3. AS 
4. BEGIN 
5. DECLARE @SQL varchar(200); 
6. 
7. SET @SQL='select PROFILE from EMPLOYEE where '; 
8. 
9. IF LEN(@Name) > 0 AND LEN(@Passwd) > 0 
10. BEGIN 
11. 
12. SELECT @SQL=@SQL-}-'NAME="'~-@Named-"' and '; 
13. SELECT @SQL=@SQL-I-'PASS="'~-@Passwd-""; 
14. 
15. END 
16. ELSE 
17. BEGIN 
18. 
19. SELECT @SQL=@SQL--'LOGIN="Guest"'; 
20. 
21. END 
22. 
23. EXEC(@SQL) 
24. 
25. END 
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Code 1. Stored Procedure Vulnerable To SQL-Injection 
A sample stored procedure called with the username and password as user inputs 
in a variable length string format is shown in Code 1. Notice that, there is an EXEC 
system function which allow the user to dynamically build a SQL statement in string 
format and later execute it. This feature is supported in most other business database 
products also. The only difference here is that the SQL statement is dynamically built in 
the database side. The techniques leveraged by the attacker to exploit this vulnerability 
is almost the same. 
1.2.3 General SQL-Injection 
An SQL Injection Attach (SQLIA) is a subset of the unverified/unsanitized input 
vulnerability and occurs when an attacker attempts to change the logic, semantics or 
syntax of a legitimate SQL statement by inserting new SQL keywords or operators into 
the statement. This definition includes, but is not limited, to attacks based on tautolo-
gies, injected additional statements, exploiting untyped parameters, stored procedures, 
overly descriptive error messages, alternate encodings, length limits, second-order injec-
tions and injection of "UNION SELECT" , "ORDER BY" and "HAVING" clauses. A 
detailed explanation of the different types and forms of SQLIAs and the ways in which 
they can be exploited are available in the public domain [7] [8] . 
The widely deployed defense today is to train the programmers and web-developers 
about the security implications of their code and to teach them corrective measures and 
good programming practices, as outlined in [43] . However, rewriting or revising the entire 
lot of existing legacy code is not an easy process and is not a financially viable option 
for many organizations. Even this does not guarantee any foolproof defense and hence 
we need automated processes to detect the vulnerability and eliminate them. Various 
other techniques like use of stored procedures [26], prohibiting display of database server 
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error messages and use of escape sequences (available in PHP as Magic Quotes) for 
sanitizing user inputs are employed as a quick fix solution. Unfortunately, even these 
security measures are inadequate against highly sophisticated attacks as outlined in [53] . 
Recently, better detection strategies like SQLIA signature detection have been proposed 
by IDS/IPS vendors [41], but their success is still limited to a small subset of the whole 
range of attack mechanisms [45] . Finally there is no known technique to capture network 
intrusion incidents caused as a result of this vulnerability [14] and is hence of great 
concern to security professionals at large. It is of even greater concern that well known 
database vendor products like Microsoft SQL Server etc. provide attackers direct access 
to the command line shell and registry using methods like xp_cmdshell, xp_regread etc. 
1.3 Related Work 
Various SQLIA detection techniques have been proposed in literature but many of 
them suffer in terms of immediate usability and deployability. Many existing techniques, 
such as filtering, information-flow analysis, penetration testing, and defensive coding, can 
detect and prevent a subset of the vulnerabilities that lead to SQLIAs. Techniques that 
employ input validation are prone to a large number of false positives and yet there is 
no guarantee that there are no false negatives; the previous section details various ways 
to bypass these checks. Safe Query Objects [57] and SQLDOM [47] use encapsulation of 
database queries to provide a safe and reliable way to access databases but they require 
developers to learn and use a new programming paradigm. SQLrand [51] provided a 
radical shift in the way this problem can be approached using query randomization [36] . 
However, it could be circumvented if the key used for randomization were to be exposed. 
The use of a machine learning technique trained using a set of typical application queries 
to detect malicious query models at runtime was proposed in [33] . However, like most 
other learning algorithms, it can generate a large number of false positives in the absence 
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of an optimal query set for training. 
Another popular mechanism has been static analysis of the code for vulnerabili-
ties [55] . The Java String Analysis library [5] provides us with a mechanism for generat-
ing models for Java strings and can be extended to generate fairly accurate SQL-query 
models. JDBC-Checker [11] [12] statically checks for the type correctness of dynamically 
generated SQL queries. Although these techniques are effective, they cannot capture 
more general forms of SQLIAs that generate syntactically and type correct queries. The 
authors combine static analysis with automated reasoning in [38] to detect tautologies 
in the dynamically generated SQL queries, but the other forms of SQLIAs would still 
succeed rendering the system vulnerable. 
Recently, researchers have been exploring the use of static analysis in conjunction 
with runtime validation [32] to detect instances of SQLIAs. In [37], the authors have 
proposed the use of parse trees to detect malicious user input. In [56], the authors 
have used an automaton construction technique to defend against SQLIAs. However, 
these techniques still require modification of the application source code which may 
not be preferable to most developers and their organizations in general. Also there 
is an additional runtime analysis overhead in terms of execution time which cannot 
be avoided due to the sequential nature of the analysis techniques. Also the element 
of access control is not captured in such models which can, in the theoretically worst 
case, still allow SQLIAs to occur for certain poor implementations of the application. 
Additionally, they implicitly restrict the character set in the user input space. Our 
solution also exercises control over the user input by combining static analysis with 
efficient runtime analysis, additionally addressing these other important issues. 
All the techniques mentioned above never pay enough attention on SQLIA in stored 
procedures and additionally, people have also looked at stored procedures as an effec-
tive defense against SQLIAs [26]. The use of stored procedures alone does not protect 
one against SQLIAs as is commonly assumed by most developers, but appropriate use 
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of parameters along with stored procedures is necessary to achieve a minimal defense 
against such attacks [17] [18]. Although the mechanism of SQLIA is the same for both 
stored procedure and application layer program, the same detection technique could not 
be applied to stored procedure because of stored procedure's limited programmability 
and the technique's usability and deployability. For SQLIA in stored procedures, we 
developed a parser which will preprocess all the stored procedures in the database and 
validate the query request on each system call. 
1.4 Our Proposed Solution 
We propose aSQL-Injection Attack prevention technique here that addresses all 
types of SQLIAs, as discussed in previous sections for both application level and stored 
procedure. The technique works by combining static analysis with runtime validation. 
The techniques applied for application level and stored procedure are similar:both appli-
cation and stored procedure source code contain key information that would help us in 
inferring models of the expected, legitimate SQL queries generated by the application at 
runtime, and that a SQLIA would necessarily violate these models. In the static analysis 
stage, we use program analysis techniques to represent the SQL-queries as Finite State 
Automata (FSA) and view them as aSQL-graph. In the runtime validation stage, we 
check the dynamically generated SQL queries with the static data structures for com-
pliance and appropriately flag them as safe or unsafe. By using aSQL-graph, we reduce 
the set of SQL statements we need to verify, by looking at only a small subset of all the 
SQL statements in the program at runtime. 
1.4.1 Static Analysis For Application Level 
To perform Static Analysis of the application source code, we make use of the Java 
String Analysis library [5] . It is essentially an inter-procedural data-flow analysis that 
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abstracts the control flow of the program and represents the semantics of string manip-
ulation operations on string variables as a flow graph. To use this analysis, we identify 
certain locations of the target program as hotspots. A hotspot is defined as a point 
in the application code that issues SQL queries to the underlying database. For each 
hotspot, we build a model that represents all the possible SQL queries that may be 
generated at that hotspot. In our analysis, we identify all the "execute" methods of 
the Statement class in Java as hotspots. Consider a sample web application having an 
authentication or login script that implements 3 functions namely, checking whether a 
user has been blacklisted, checking whether the user is using aweak/insecure password 
and then authenticating the user. Code 1 represent a small code snippet from such a 
sample application. We then identify lines 15, 20 and 25 as hotspots. The Strings login 
and pass are user inputs and the 3 functions Blacl~List, Weal~Passwd and Authenticate 
are each used to construct SQL queries (stored in variable sql) . 
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1. public class Authenticate extends HttpServlet { 
2. 
3. public void StatusCheck() { 
4. 
5. Connection conn = DriverManager.getConnection(connString); 
6. Statement stmt = conn.createStatement(); 
7. ResultSet output_1 = BlackList(stmt, login, pass); 
8. ResultSet output_2 = WeakPasswd(stmt, login, pass); 
9. ResultSet output_3 = Authenticate(stmt, login, pass); 
10. 
11. } 
12. public ResultSet Blacklist (Statement stmt, String login, String pass) { 
13. String sql = "SELECT *FROM user "; 
14. sql -}-_ "WHERE login = "' +login -{-   , 
15. return stmt.executeQuery(sgl); 
16. } 
17. public ResultSet WeakPasswd (Statement stmt, String login, String pass) { 
18. String sql = "SELECT *FROM weak_pass "; 
19. sql -{-_ "WHERE pass = "' -}- pass -1- ""' ; 
20. return stmt.executeQuery(sgl); 
21. } 
22. public ResultSet Authenticate (Statement stmt, String login, String pass) { 
23. String sql = "SELECT *FROM user WHERE "; 
24. sql -I-= "login = "' +login ~- "' AND pass = "' -I- pass -I-   ; 
25. return stmt.executeQuery(sgl); 
26. } 
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27. } 
Code 1: Sample Code with 3 Hotspots, 3 SQL Queries, 2 User Inputs 
The string analysis uses the SOOT Framework [48] [39] to parse a class file and pro-
duce inter-procedural control-flow graphs. Starting with the hotspots in a Java program, 
it keeps track of the String, StringBuffer and multidimensional String Arrays that get 
manipulated and thus construct a flow graph. The nodes in the flow graph represent 
variables or expressions, the edges represent directed def--use relationships for the possi-
ble data flow while the string manipulation methods are represented as operators. 
( Frngmcnt_1 ) Trim 
Replace('('; (') 
SQL_Statement = Fragment_1.TrimQ + Fragment_2.Replace('(','{') ; 
Figure 1.1 String Analysis 
In Fig. 1.1, nodes Trim, Replace and Concat represent string operations, while Frag-
ment_1, Fragment_ and SQL_Statement represent variables or expressions. 
1.4.1.1 SQL ]E'inite State Machine 
The final result of the string analysis is allon-Deterministic Finite State Automaton 
(NDFA) that expresses all the possible values a particular string can assume using sin-
gle character transitions in the automaton. We now create a SQL Finite State Machine 
(SQL-FSM) by performing a depth first traversal of the NDFA for that hotspot and 
grouping characters as either SQL keywords, operators, or literal values, and creating 
transitions that are annotated by the literal values (tol~ens). Each SQL keyword is rep-
resented as is, while the user input string variables are represented as VAR, indicating 
that they can change at runtime. Fig. 1.2 shows the NDFA and SQL-FSM for the first 
hotspot in the sample code. Note that in the general case, both the NDFA and SQL-FSM 
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can have multiple non-looping branches, indicating possible execution of multiple SQL 
queries at a single hotspot. 
S „E~L~E ~C ~T ~[] ~* ~[] 
W,.,H ~E~R~E~[] 
F _R 
L _0 
O,.,M ~(] ~U 
G ~I ,.,N~[] 
S ~E ~R ~[ ] 
[l ' VAR 
SELECT identifier FROM identifier WHERE identifier 
~~~ (*) ~ ~ ~ (user) ~ ~ ~ ~ (login) ~~ 
identifier ' 
~ ~ ~ ~ (VAR) ~ ~ ~ 
e 
Figure 1.2 NDFA and SQL-FSM Construction for a Hotspot 
1.4.1.2 SQL-graph Representation 
We can thus construct aSQL-FSM for each of the hotspots in the program. These 
data structures now capture the semantics of the different SQL queries that are to be 
sent to the database at runtime. Any user input would be compared against this tem-
plate and any change in the SQL-FSM structure would indicate a possible SQL-Injection 
Attack. We note that running each and every query under the scanner at runtime could 
be an expensive process. Given that the user input would realistically consist of a few 
strings only but the number of SQL queries that get executed in a program could be 
very large, we now try to optimize the number of queries that need to be put under 
the scanner during runtime to ensure the validity and legitimacy of the dynamically 
generated queries, using aSQL-graph. 
The SQL-graph in Fig. 1.3 represents 4 different SQL queries in the program as 
nodes within a logical boundary, and 3 different user inputs as being outside the logical 
boundary. If a particular user input (I) is used in a SQL query (Q~, the relationship 
(R) between the two nodes is indicated by an undirected link between the 2 nodes. 
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Qi, Q2, Q3, Q4 
I i , I2, I3 
SQL Queries 
User Inputs 
Rl Il E Qi 
R2 I2 E Q1 
R3 Il E Q3 
R4 Ia E Qa 
R5 I3 E Q4 
Dl Q3 C Q1 
D2 Q2 C Q1 
Figure 1.3 SQL-graph Representation 
We now define dependencies (D) in the SQL-graph as links that point from one SQL 
query to another SQL query such that the user inputs used by the former is a proper 
superset of the user inputs used by the latter. For SQL queries that use the same set 
of user inputs, one of them is chosen as a representative query and is made to point to 
the others. We see the dependencies represented as directed arrows in the SQL-graph. 
Drawing equivalence to Code 1, Q1, Q2 and Q3 represent the 3 different SQL queries 
(also the 3 different hotspots in this case), while I l and I2 represent the user inputs login 
and pass. Q4 and I3 could possibly correspond to some other hotspot in the program not 
represented in the code snippet. 
The concept of a SQL-graph is used to reduce the runtime scanning overhead by 
restricting the number of queries that need to be scanned along any execution path that 
is taken in the program. SQL queries that do not use user inputs are not included in the 
SQL-graph. Only the SQL queries that are exposed to the user inputs in some form or the 
other (string manipulations included) are included in the SQL-graph representation. The 
choice of such a representation and the resulting benefits in terms of runtime overhead 
would be explained as part of Runtime Validation. 
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1.4.2 Static Analysis For Stored Procedure 
To perform static analysis of the stored procedure, we propose a stored procedure 
parser which extracts the control flow graph from the stored procedure. We label all the 
EXEC(@SQL) statements in the control flow graph and then backtrack to identify all 
the statements involved in the construction of the @SQL statement in the control flow 
graph. In this process, aSQL-graph as explained above is generated. From the SQL-
graph, SQL statements which depend on user inputs are selected and flagged to monitor 
their structure at runtime. At runtime, we compare the structure of the original intended 
SQL statement with the dynamically generated SQL statement having user inputs by 
using a Finite State Automata. A SQLIA which alters the original structure will be 
flagged as unsafe and related information would be logged. 
1.4.2.1 SQL-graph Generation 
Different from the application level, we use the stored procedure parser to extract the 
control flow graph of the stored procedure and label every statement which contains an 
EXEC() call. Then we backtrack in the control flow graph using a breadth first search 
algorithm from the labeled statement, trying to find all the statements involved in the 
construction of the queries in the EXEC() call. During the process of searching, we keep 
track of how the query is incrementally built in the stored procedure. SQL queries are 
differentiated by labeling them according to their sequence in the control flow graph, 
and user inputs by their position in the arguments list of the stored procedure. After the 
search reaches the beginning of the stored procedure, aSQL-graph similar to Fig. 1.3 
we introduced would be built. 
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1. CREATE PROCEDURE [EMP].[RetrieveProfile] @Name varchar(50), @Passwd varchar(50) 
2. WITH EXECUTE AS CALLER 
3. AS 
4. BEGIN 
5. DECLARE @SQL varchar(200); 
6. 
7. SET @SQL='select PROFILE from EMPLOYEE where '; 
8. 
9. IF LEN(@Name) > 0 AND LEN(@Passwd) > 0 
10. BEGIN 
11. 
12. SELECT @SQL=@SQL-{-'NAME="'-I-MARK(@Name)+"' and '; 
13. SELECT @SQL=@SQL-}-'PASSWD="'-MARK(@Passwd)-I-""; 
14. 
15. END 
16. ELSE 
17. BEGIN 
18. 
19. SELECT @SQL=@SQL-I-'NAME="Guest"'; 
20. 
21. END 
22. 
23. EXEC(SQLIAcxEcxER(@SQL)) 
24. 
25. END 
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Code 2. Stored Procedure not vulnerable to SQLIAs 
1.4.2.2 Instrumentation 
In order to monitor the structure of the SQL statement at runtime, we need to 
instrument the original stored procedure. In the process of static analysis of application 
level, the source code would not need to be instrumented as there is an extra layer which 
is application server between the application source code and database, while in stored 
procedure we do not have such layer. This operation is also implemented by our parser. 
In this process, we separate the user inputs from the original SQL statement by pre- and 
post-pending a mark, which in our implementation is the session id. The mark should 
be chosen wisely, or it might be guessed by the attacker. In order to avoid collisions 
with user inputs, each mark (random string of bytes) can be checked for occurence in 
any of the user inputs and modified accordingly in the face of a collision or otherwise 
retained as is. We do not impose any restrictions on the choice of the mark and leave this 
open as a design issue. Each SQL string is enclosed by the SQLIAcxEcxER() function 
which does the runtime validation and legitimacy check. We implement this function 
using C~. We use another function called MARK() which returns the current session id 
and pre- and post-pends the argument passed to it with that mark. Instrumentation is 
done automatically in accordance with the SQL-graph discussed in the previous section. 
Code 2 shows that instrumented version of Code 1, as illustrated previously. 
1.4.3 Runtime Analysis for Application Level 
During runtime, the SQL queries (with the user inputs embedded) are compared 
against the corresponding SQL-FSMs to check for their validity. If the user inputs cause 
the dynamically generated SQL queries to not conform to the semantics of the intended 
SQL queries as in the SQL-FSMs, then they are flagged as SQLIAs, else they are passed 
through. Fig. 1.5 shows the case where an SQLIA is not caused and the query is passed 
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through. Also, it shows the second example where an SQLIA has been caused and 
hence gets rejected as a potentially malicious query. The literals along both the static 
SQL-FSM and the runtime SQL-FSM, as one traverses from the Start node to the End 
node, should be identical. The other check that can be enforced is that the length of the 
SQL-FSM chain for a particular instance is exactly the same for the static and runtime 
SQL-ESNs. Thus SQLIAs employing tautologies and injecting additional statements can 
be captured by this technique. The case where alternate encodings like URL Encoding, 
UTF-8 etc. are used by the attackers can also be addressed by requiring the runtime 
validation to occur only after all the user input has been converted to a single encoding 
format as interpreted by the SQL Engine in the database server. All other advanced IDS 
evasion techniques like IP fragmentation, TCP segmentation etc. [45] are also captured 
by this technique. 
The SQL-graphs for the different programs or applications resident on the application 
server are computed offline, using static analysis as described above. These SQL-graphs 
need to be constantly updated to reflect any changes in the code made by the program-
mer at any point of time. Hence, each of these SQL-graphs is associated with a version 
number that corresponds to the last modification timestamp on the original application 
source code. Every time the SQL-graph is invoked, the version number is checked to see 
whether it is current, else it is recomputed. Every time a client request comes in, the 
user inputs are fed into the SQL-graph and the runtime SQL-ESNs of the different SQL 
queries in the SQL-graph are validated. A Verification Table (VT) is then computed 
for the different SQL queries indicating whether it can be allowed to pass through or 
whether it should be dropped before being sent to the database server. Now verifying 
the SQL-FSM for all the queries in the SQL-graph can be computationally intensive and 
can be expensive in terms of the runtime processing time for the webpage, resulting in 
degraded Quality of Service (QoS) to the end-users accessing the web-page. The concept 
of the directed dependency is used to reduce the total runtime overhead. 
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Figure 1.4 SQL-Injection Attack Detection: SQL-FSM Violation 
If an user input does not cause any SQLIA in one query, it means that it conforms 
well to the SQL query semantics as defined by the SQL language. Then it is implicitly 
known that the same input in any other query would also not cause a SQLIA. Hence, we 
see that if this knowledge is not exploited, we would be redundantly verifying the same 
user input over and over again in multiple SQL queries in the SQL-graph. The directed 
dependency in the SQL-graph tells us which SQL queries are supersets of which other 
SQL queries in the SQL-graph. It would suffice to check only those SQL queries that 
are supersets of other queries and thus implicitly check the other queries encompassed 
by it. Thus we filter out all those SQL queries that have no directed dependency edges 
coming into them and verify only the validity of the SQL-FSMs corresponding to those 
SQL queries. We thus see that we need to validate only a small fraction of the entire 
SQL-graph and still achieve SQLIA prevention guarantee. In Fig. 1.3, it would suffice 
to check SQL-FSMs corresponding to SQL queries Qi and Q4. In Code 1, normally 
the SQL-FSMs for Qi , Q2 and Q3 would have been invoked, while using aSQL-graph 
we need to invoke the SQL-FSM for Qi only. Thus we can achieve optimal SQLIA 
prevention using runtime validation of the abstraction of the application source code 
generated by static analysis. 
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1.4.4 Runtime Analysis for Stored Procedure 
During runtime, before the EXEC() function is called, the SQLIAcxEcxER() func-
tion will identify the user input by the current session id and build a finite state automata 
as shown in Figure 1.5. Then, the SQL statement with user inputs filled in (the marks 
are ignored in this case), is compared against the corresponding finite state automata to 
check for validity. If the user inputs cause the dynamically generated SQL queries to not 
conform to the semantics of the intended SQL queries as in the finite state automata, 
then they are flagged as SQLIAs, else they are passed through. Figure 1.5 shows the 
case where an SQLIA is not caused and the query is passed through ie. it is similar to 
the automata construct. Also, it shows the second example where an SQLIA has been 
caused and hence gets rejected as a potentially malicious query. 
To facilitate easy modification of the code by the developer in a transparent manner, 
we have aturn-off option for our parser. The developers simply need to use the turn-off 
option to remove all the instrumentation and the corresponding SQL-graphs, alter the 
code as desired and then rebuild these elements again. 
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Figure 1.5 SQL-Injection Attack Detection: SQL-FSM Violation 
As the use of the SQL-graph is basically the same with it does in application level, 
we won't explain it here gain. 
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1.5 Architecture 
For stored procedures, since there is no extra layers but the database engine itself, 
we have no way to intercept execution information, so the architecture is rather simple. 
But in the application level, we could make use of the current popular 3-tier architecture 
to achieve extra performance. In this section, we will mainly talk about the architecture 
in the application level. 
One of the distinguishing features of the proposed technique as opposed to other 
known techniques in literature, is its transparent mode of operation requiring no changes 
to the underlying application source code. The proposed technique can be implemented 
as a minor modification to the existing web server architecture by use of a middleware, 
thereby eliminating the need to tamper with the application code. Fig. 1.6 is a mod-
ular representation of the proposed architecture. The client request (HTML or XML 
request) is directly processed by the Web Server (WS) and in the normal case, the web 
server forwards the request to the Script Engine (SE) in the Application Server (AS), 
which then issues SQL queries to the Database Server (DS) and replies back to the 
client. In the modified architecture, the web server duplicates the request and sends it 
to the Application Middleware (AM) in addition to sending the request to the script 
engine. The SQL queries generated dynamically by the script engine pass through the 
Database Middleware (DM) before it is actually sent to the database server. The AM 
also sends the Verification Table (VT) to the DM. Thus the new architecture consists 
of 2 new modules, namely the Application Middleware and the Database Middleware. 
These changes can be easily incorporated into the current web server architecture by 
installing a few patches (prototype implementation discussed in the next section) and is 
just a one time deployment requiring only a single restart to the web server daemon. 
The. SQL-graphs and the SQL-FSMs for all the different application programs avail-
able for public use, are stored at the AM. Every time the AM receives a request com-
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Figure 1.6 Proposed Architecture 
prising of the user inputs and the program to be invoked, it fetches the cached copy 
of that program's SQL-graph and corresponding SQL-FSMs. It validates the version 
number of the SQL-graph by comparing it with the last modification timestamp on the 
corresponding program source code. If it is a stale copy, it issues a recompute command 
and waits for it to complete. If it is still a fresh copy, it then runs a runtime validation 
on the SQL-graph by comparing the static and runtime SQL-FSMs. It then generates 
a Verification Table (VT) indicating which SQL queries can be passed as is and which 
need to be dropped before it reaches the database server. This VT is sent to the DM 
through a control channel. The script engine issues SQL queries which then get filtered 
based on the VT before they are sent to the database server. We thus see that using the 
current architecture, we can prevent all incidents of SQLIAs in a transparent manner. 
The code independent nature of this scheme makes its deployment commercially viable 
and easy to implement without fear that it could break any existing functionality offered 
by that service. 
As there could be many SQL queries in the program currently being executed, we 
would need to associate a hotspot with its corresponding SQL-FSM to avoid raising 
false alarms. We thus need to associate a unique identifier with every hotspot and its 
corresponding SQL-FSM in the SQL-graph for every program. The choice of the unique 
identifier can technically be any parameter, preferably one that is most suitable to the 
underlying application. For example, we could use the SOOT Framework [48] and use 
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the line number of the hotspot as the unique identifier. We do not impose any restrictions 
on the choice of this parameter and leave this open as a design issue. 
Although the runtime overhead incurred due to the extra SQLIA validation is min-
imal as verified by the prototype evaluation, we would still ideally like to reduce this 
overhead to provide the users an enhanced web browsing experience, with added security 
without any noticeable processing latency or delay. We try to achieve this by introduc-
ing parallelism in the proposed architecture to reduce the overall execution time. If 
the Application Middleware and the Script Engine were to run sequentially, the total 
runtime of the application would be the sum total of the original execution time and 
the extra overhead. But by requiring the web server to feed the request to both of them 
simultaneously, we let both of them operate in parallel, thus effectively cutting down 
the execution time to the maximum of the original execution time and the extra over-
head. Experimental verification of the performance improvement due to this parallelism 
introduced in the architecture is provided in the prototype evaluation section. 
1.5.1 Enhanced Features 
1.5.1.1 Access Control Enforcement 
Consider a hypothetical web application maintained by the Patent and Copyright 
division in some corporation. The company policies require that if an employee is 
connecting from within the corporate network and is authenticated, then he is given 
unrestricted access to the entire patent database, using his true passphrase. However, 
if the user is not connecting from within the corporate network, he is given a default 
passphrase to access limited portions of the database. If both the default passphrase 
and the true passphrase giving unrestricted access for every employee are both stored in 
a single table in the database and the web application is badly implemented as indicated 
in Code 2, it gives ample scope for aSQL-Injection Attack employing access control vi-
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olation to succeed. Let us suppose that the default passphrase is returned on not being 
authenticated and the unrestricted access passphrase is returned on successful authen-
tication by the application. An employee now connecting from outside the corporate 
network and providing a login as ~<employee-id> AND pass = '<password>~ would get 
access to the true passphrase as the user input would cause aSQL-Injection Attack and 
authenticate him successfully. Thus the employee can bypass the security mechanisms 
put in place. It would be of even greater concern if the employee's password has been 
compromised by some hacker and then used in turn to steal all confidential data. Al-
though the chances of such an implementation are quite rare, there is no guarantee that 
the programmers would have ever forseen such a situation and designed the application 
in an intelligent manner. 
This SQLIA would not be captured by most known detection strategies including 
static analysis technique employing runtime monitoring. Line 12 in the code represents 
a hotspot and both the SQL queries correspond to the same hotspot. As the SQL-FSMs 
are constructed for the hotspots, both these queries are treated as valid at that hotspot. 
However, the actual SQL query in the application code that caused that hotspot to 
be reached could be different from the one that it is validated against during runtime. 
Thus access control in terms of which query triggers the hotspot is not captured by 
any known technique. Although it represents a very restrictive class of SQL-Injection 
Attacks, it could still be a potential pitfall against targeted hackers. Our prototype has 
been designed to additionally capture the access control semantics of the code during 
static analysis and runtime validation to prevent the occurence of such an attack. The 
implementation details are not presented here due to space constraints. 
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1. public class Copyrightedlnfo extends HttpServlet { 
2. 
3. 
4. 
public ResultSet AccessKey (String login, String pass) { 
5. Connection Conn = DriverManager.getConnection(connString); 
6. Statement stmt = conn.createStatement(); 
7. String sql = "SELECT *FROM passphrase"; 
8. if (WithinCorporateNetwork() _= 0) 
9. sql -~_ "WHERE login = "' -{- login -I- ""' 
10. else 
11. sql -~_ "WHERE login = "' -I- login + "' AND pass = "' -{- pass + , 
12. return stmt.executeQuery(sgl); 
13. } 
14. } 
Code 2: Sample Code showing possible Access Control Violation 
1.5.1.2 Complete Character Set Inclusion for User Input 
Most of the SQL-Injection Attack prevention techniques proposed in literature work 
under the assumption that the user does not enter a quote or tick (') as part of the 
legitimate user input. Each such attempt would be treated as an SQL injection attempt 
by the web server. However this would not be liked by developers and users alike as 
there is no valid reason why users cannot use the quotation marks as part of their 
user inputs. With no additional modifications, our technique is also prone to such 
a restriction. For any technique to gain widespread acceptance, this issue has to be 
addressed by all the researchers and security professionals alike. We propose a simple 
randomization approach to tackle this problem. The quotation marks as interpreted 
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by the SQL-graphs during runtime would keep varying randomly with time and the 
substitute representation could be any bitstream or bytestream. The randomness would 
ensure that there is only a very low probability that a legitimate user input would be 
falsely flagged as a SQLIA. The compromise of the random generator seed or the next 
occurring random number would not still affect the system as it would still have to 
pass through the runtime validation and any manipulative SQLIA would be captured 
at that stage. Implementation details and prototype evaluation of this fix would not be 
discussed here due to space constraints. 
1.6 Prototype Evaluation 
In order to evaluate our approach, we developed a prototype of our proposed tech-
nique and deployed it on an existing web server. We ran a few trial runs on the web 
server before the new prototype was deployed and repeated the same tests on the new 
setup. The results of these tests are presented below. The performance metrics we used 
for comparison were the number of false positives generated, number of false negatives 
generated and the extra processing overhead during runtime as tested on a few rep-
resentative web applications having varying number of SQL queries and tokens in the 
application code. For stored procedures, we ran similar effectiveness test on the database 
before and after the prevention technique was applied. 
1.6.1 Evaluation for Application Level 
1.6.1.1 SQLIA Detection Accuracy 
We subjected both the protected and the unprotected web servers to different types of 
SQLIAs namely use of tautologies, inserting additional SQL statements, access control 
violation in the program, second-order SQL injection [7] and various other SQLIAs 
known in literature. We also tested the impact when a user enters a legitimate (') 
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symbol as part of the user input. The proposed technique detected all types of SQLIAs 
under all circumstances and in all cases. The details as to how the false negatives due to 
access control violation and false positives due to valid user input of (') can be tackled 
would be provided in the extended version and not here, due to space constraints. The 
proposed technique is thus a secure and robust solution to defend against SQL-Injection 
Attacks. 
Table 1.1 SQLIA Detection Accuracy 
SQLIA Type Unprotected Server Protected Server 
Use of Tautologies 
Additional SQL statements 
Access Control Violation 
Valid User Input of (') 
Second-Order SQL Injection 
Other SQLIAs 
Not Detected 
Not Detected 
Not Detected 
SQL Query allowed 
Not Detected 
Not Detected 
SQLIA Detected 
SQLIA Detected 
False Negative 
False Positive 
SQLIA Detected 
SQLIAs Detected 
1.6.1.2 Program Execution Time -Static Analysis 
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Figure 1.7 Overhead due to Static Analysis 
The proposed technique introduces two types of overhead. The first overhead is due 
to the static analysis of the application source code to construct SQL-FSMs and SQL-
graphs and the second due to runtime validation. As the static analysis is an offline 
process, the users do not experience the delay induced due to this one-time operation 
(until next code modification is done). Fig. 1.7 shows the time required for the static 
analysis to complete when executed on different programs having varying number of 
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hotspots with different number of SQL queries and tokens. The graph shows the time 
taken in seconds by this of~line process, for different values of the total number of tokens 
in the SQL queries in the program. All experiments were run on a Desktop PC (not a 
server class machine), Pentium III 800 Mhz (1 GB RAM) system running Windows XP. 
1.6.1.3 Program Execution Time -Runtime Validation 
The runtime validation incurs some overhead in terms of execution time at both the 
Application Middleware and the Database Middleware. We again consider two different 
architectures here, namely sequential and parallel depending on whether the Application 
Middleware and the Script Engine in the Application Server, run concurrently or one 
after another in a pipelined fashion. These experiments were run on 3 different programs 
having identical SQL-graphs and SQL-FSMs i.e. the difference between the 3 programs 
is the extra computation time at the Script Engine alone. We denote by S, the execution 
time for the program at the Script Engine. We denote by M, the execution time for the 
program at the Application Middleware. When tested under the different experimental 
conditions, namely varying the number of hotspots, number of SQL queries and tokens 
in the program, we see that for the programs Sl and S2, S < M and S > M respectively 
in all cases, while for S3, the relationship between S and M is variable. Fig. 1.8 shows 
the results of running these benchmarking tests on the different systems under varying 
program conditions. 
For the program S1, we see that the Application Middleware always takes longer to 
execute than the Script Engine. Hence, the user does experience a negligible delay of 
the order of a couple of milliseconds, on a parallel architecture. The delay is much more 
significant when run on a sequential architecture. For the program S2, the Application 
Middleware always finishes quicker than the Script Engine and hence the user does not 
experience any delay at the Application Server. However, the user would experience a 
delay at the Database Middleware, which is of the order of a few hundred microseconds. 
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Figure 1.8 Program Execution Time w/ and w/o SQLIA Protection (Se-
quential/Parallel Architecture) 
This delay has been amplified a bit in the graph to distinguish between the different 
curves in the graph. For the program S3, the Script Engine executes faster when there 
are fewer tokens in the SQL queries in the program, while the Application Middleware 
is faster as this count increases. The overall execution time is the higher of the two 
runtime durations at all times. Note that the parallel architecture performs better than 
the sequential architecture in all cases. Also, the experiments indicate that when the 
Database Middleware acts as a blocking device waiting for both the inputs to reach it 
before execution, the actual execution overhead at the Database Middleware is negligible, 
amounting to a few microseconds. We thus see that although traditionally people have 
looked at sequential architectures as filtering modules for SQLIAs and other attacks also, 
the parallel architecture that we propose actually outperforms it. Also the proposed 
architecture implements the technique in a transparent manner requiring no change to 
the source code and the programmers can remain oblivious to the existence of such 
an attack prevention middleware. We have also systematically studied the effect of 
concurrent program executions or multiple client requests arriving simultaneously and 
we note that there is no significant degradation in the performance and is almost always 
hardly noticeable to the end-user. These results are not presented here due to space 
constraints, 
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1.6.2 Evaluation for Stored Procedure 
1.6.2.1 SQLIA Detection Accuracy 
We did some similar runs as we did for the application level as the results below 
shows. 
Table 1.2 SQLIA Detection Accuracy 
SQLIA Type Unprotected Protected Server 
Use of Tautologies 
Additional SQL statements 
Valid User Input of (') 
Second-Order Injection 
Other SQLIAs 
Not Detected 
Not Detected 
Query allowed 
Not Detected 
Not Detected 
SQLIA Detected 
SQLIA Detected 
False Positive 
SQLIA Detected 
SQLIAs Detected 
1.6.2.2 Program Execution Time 
The same as the application level, the first overhead is due to the static analysis of 
the application source code to construct SQL-graph and instrument the code which is an 
oflline operation while the second is due to runtime finite state automata construction 
and validation. 
We studied the overhead of running various benchmarking tests on the same database 
instance under varying program conditions. These experiments were run on a sin-
gle stored procedure and can easily be extended for multiple stored procedures in the 
database. 
In the first experiment, we varied the number of EXEC() statements in the stored 
procedure, each having 20 SQL tokens on an average. Fig. 1.9 shows the runtime execu-
tion time for both the instances where security has been enabled and also where it has 
been disabled. We see that the overhead imposed due to the finite state automata con-
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struction and verification is negligible as compared to the execution time for the program. 
N a 
c 
0 
v m 
N 
O 
L 
V .~ 
c 
m 
E 
1— 
C 
0 
:~ 3 v 
a> x 
W 
50000 
45000 
40000 
35DOD 
3000D 
25000 
20000 
15000 
10000 
5000 
0 
Execution Time (Security Enabled) 
---~--- Execution Time (Security Disabled) 
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 
Number of EXEC{) Statements in the Program 
Figure 1.9 Prototype Evaluation: Runtime Analysis I 
In the second experiment, we varied the number of SQL tokens in a single EXEC() 
statement in the stored procedure. Fig. 1.10 shows the runtime execution time for both 
the instances where security has been enabled and also where it has been disabled. The 
graphs have been plotted both on a logarithmic as well as on a linear scale for visual 
clarity. The graphs also indicate the time required for the finite state automata con-
struction as well as for runtime comparison and verification of the dynamically generated 
SQL query with the finite state automata. The time required for the extra processing 
overhead is negligible as compared to the normal execution time for the program. Ap-
propriate care was taken to ensure that the SQL queries were not available in the cache 
at any point of time to obtain the worst case execution times for the program. 
1.7 Conclusions and Future Work 
Most web applications employ a middleware technology (scripting engine) designed 
to request information from a relational database in SQL parlance. SQL injection is 
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Figure 1.10 Prototype Evaluation: Runtime Analysis II 
a common techniques hackers employ to attack these web-based applications. These 
attacks reshape the SQL queries, thus altering the behavior of the program for the benefit 
of the hacker. Here, we present a fully automated technique for detecting, preventing 
and reporting SQLIA incidents both in application level and stored procedure. The 
technique abstracts the intended SQL query behavior in an application in the form of 
a SQL-graph, as a one-time ofl~ine procedure using static analysis of the source code. 
This graph is then validated against all the different user inputs at runtime to capture 
all malicious SQL queries, before they are sent to the database server for execution. 
This graph model helps in capturing all the different types and modes of execution of 
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SQLIAs, in a transparent manner requiring no modification to the underlying application 
source code. We also have provided preliminary evaluation results of the prototype we 
developed against the various performance metrics affecting web server performance. 
As part of future work, we plan to extend our prototype to develop a complete 
implementation of the proposed architecture. This would then be used as a testbed 
to evaluate the different web application and stored procedure scripts available in the 
public domain. We are currently exploring the security implications of incorporating well 
known randomization algorithms into our model to eliminate the restriction imposed on 
the character set available for user input. We are also currently evaluating different 
models that enforce access control to achieve an optimal web server performance. As for 
stored procedure, we are also exploring the possibility of implementing this functionality 
as a middleware before the database engine, to avoid explicit instrumentation of source 
code. 
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CHAPTER 2. SQL Stored Procedure Code Coverage Tool 
This chapter describes design and implementation of a code coverage tool for stored 
procedure. This tool gives flexibility to allow user specify in which level the source code is 
instrumented and certain data is collected. This tool is integrated with Microsoft SQL 
Server 2005 management studio and it has a stored procedure interpreter, a working 
database and a coverage schema file. Once a stored procedure call is done, a code 
coverage report will be generated and ready to show to the user. In this paper, it 
presents experiments and results for certain benchmark case and it gives an overview of 
its possible applications areas. 
2.1 Introduction 
In the development of software, software testing is one of the most important phases. 
As exhaustive testing is generally impossible, test coverage is employed to giveaway 
to determine how much testing should be done and how much code branches has been 
covered by certain test case. The IEEE standard glossary of software engineering ter-
minology [49] defines test coverage as "the degree to which a given test or set of tests 
addresses all specified requirements for a given system or component" . Y. K. Malaiya 
and J. A. Denton [30] state that "software test coverage directly measures the thorough-
ness of testing avoiding the problem of variations of test effectiveness" . Certain coverage 
metrics are defined to measure the thoroughness of code being covered. We will talk 
about coverage metrics in the next section. 
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2.1.1 Stored Procedure 
There are many commercial code coverage tools for C and Java, but seldom for stored 
procedure though during the evolution of modern software system, stored procedure 
constitutes large portion of legacy code. A stored procedure is a program which is 
physically stored within a database. The exact implementation of a stored procedure 
varies from one database to another. In most cases however stored procedures allow for 
an API to be defined for a database, rather than having a client application interact 
with the tables and other database objects directly [27]. Stored procedures are widely 
used in all the popular relational commercial database system as it gives the following 
advantage: 
• Higher performance: A stored procedure especially composed of several complex 
queries often runs faster combined than if it had been implemented as, for example, 
a program running on a client computer which communicates with the database 
by submitting the SQL queries one by one. As stored procedure is stored in the 
database server side, by having complex logic run inside the database engine via a 
stored procedure, numerous context switches and a great deal of network traffic can 
be eliminated. The database server only needs to send the final results back to the 
user, doing away with the overhead of communicating potentially large amounts 
of interim data back and forth [27] . 
• Simplication of data management: Stored procedure allow for business logic to 
be embedded as an API in the database, which can simplify data management. 
By providing an API that implements business logic within the database using 
stored procedures, the need to duplicate logic within client programs is lessened 
or eliminated. If managed appropriately, this may result in a lesser likelihood of 
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data becoming corrupted through the use of client programs that are out of date, 
or that have not been updated as intended [27] . 
• Security: The implementation of stored procedure is hidden, and certain logic 
which need to be secured could be encapsuled by stored procedure and user has 
no way but to call the stored procedure. 
Although SQL stored procedure is core of many business products and online services 
produced by the company, not enough attention has been paid. It is common misun-
derstanding that stored procedure won't involve business logic, so the size of the code 
won't be huge. However, lots of business transactions and database system functions 
are writtenn as stored procedure. Stored procedure is as important as any other client 
code written in C or Java. 
2.1.2 Code Coverage Metrics 
In [2], it gives a ratio to measure code coverage as: 
Coverage = (items executed at least once) / (total number of items) 
But with just this ratio, it is hard to tell the detailed coverage information. Structural 
coverage, also known as white box testing, can be divided in control flow coverage and 
data flow coverage. Control flow coverage consists of the following metrics as defined in 
[2] 
• Statement coverage: each statement is executed at least once. 
• Bloch coverage: each basic block is executed at least once. 
• Decision coverage: each statement is executed at least once; each decision takes 
on all possible outcomes at least once. 
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• Condition coverage: each statement is executed at least once; each condition in a 
decision takes on all possible outcomes at least once. 
• Decision/condition coverage: each statement is executed at least once; each deci-
sion takes on all possible outcomes at least once; each condition in a decision takes 
on all possible outcomes at least once. 
• Multiple condition coverage: each statement is executed at least once; all possible 
combinations of condition outcomes in each decision occur at least once. 
• Modifced Condition/Decision Coverage: every condition within a decision is exe-
cuted in order to show that it can independently affect the outcome of the decision. 
On the other hand, data flow coverage comprises the following metrics as defined in 
[40] . 
• c-use: a c-use is a variable x and the set of all paths in the data flow graph from 
node na to nb such that: 
x is in DEF(na), and 
x is not in DEF(nZ) for any other node n2 on the paths, and 
—xis in C-USE(nb) 
A c-use is covered by a set of tests if at least one of the paths in the c-use is 
executed when the test is run. 
• p-use: a p-use is a variable x, a predicate node, n~, which uses x in some predicate 
expression, and the set of all paths in the data flow graph from node na to nb such 
that: 
—xis in DEF(na ), and 
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Figure 2.1 Subsumption hierarchy of coverage criteria 
—xis not in DEF(ni) for any other node n2 on the paths except possibly n~, 
and 
—xis in P-USE(nb) 
A p-use is covered by a set of tests if at least one of the paths in the p-use is 
executed when the test is run. 
• all-use: an all-use is a c-use or a p-use. An all-use is covered by a set of tests if 
at least one of the paths in the c-use or p-use is executed when the testis run. 
Among all these coverage metrics, they are not completely separated. For example, 
by the definition of block coverage, 100% block coverage implies 100°~o statement coverage 
and 100°~o statement coverage implies 100°~o block coverage. They are also known as line 
coverage. Horgan et al. [40] and Chilenski et al. [16] present diagrams showing the 
Subsumption hierarchies of coverage criteria. Figure 2.1 shows a combination of those 
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hierarchies. Further information about data flow coverage is beyond the scope of this 
thesis and can be found on [40] . 
if (conc~.itio.lzl && (eonc~.iti©n'2 ~ ~ conditon3~} . . . 
Figure 2.2 Code snippet with conditions 
We take the example from [2] to illustrate the definition of condition and decision 
coverage. A condition is an Boolean expression which could not be broken into simpler 
one and a decision is composed by one or more than one conditions. Figure 2.2 shows a 
code snippet for the example. 
Full Decision/condition coverage means that every statement in each condition should 
execute at least once, and each condition should be evaluated both true and false, and 
different value combination should be covered. Full Decision/condition coverage can be 
huge. 
2.2 Code Coverage Problem 
A well-known problem for code coverage tool is the runtime overhead incurred by the 
instrumentation. The more detailed coverage information we want to get, the more code 
we need to instrument and the more runtime we would expect. So there is a trade-off 
between precision and performance. To compute certain coverage metrics, a set of data 
need to be collected. As mentioned in the previous section, there are lots of coverage 
metrics. More coverage metrics obtained means more data need to be collected. 
In order to solve this problems, several approaches have been proposed such as selec-
tive instrumentation, dynamic instrumentation, sampling, reduction of instrumentation 
points. In the next section, we will review those previous research and later give our 
proposed solution. 
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2.2.1 Related work 
Code coverage measures are important in the test phase to quantify the thorough-
fullness and identify weaknesses in their test suites. It also allows the designer to identify 
possible bugs or dead code thus speeding verification. It is a common mistake that testers 
usually overestimate the coverage of their test cases [46] . An experiment showed that 
expected 90% of coverage and results showed only a coverage of 50°0. They also showed 
that 70-80°~o coverage is the ideal percentage considering the precision/cost tradeoff. 
In [54], instrumentation is divided into dynamic and static. Static instrumentation 
means, target program is instrumented in the very beginning, in other words, before 
execution, and the code remain in the instrumented program. While dynamic instrume-
nation allows inserting and removing instrumentation code as the program runs. With 
dynamic instrumentation, user could decide in runtime which part of the instrumentation 
code is necessary, so performance could be gained. Obviously, dynamic instrumentation 
is much more complex than dynamic instrumentation. 
In [50], instrumentation could be performed at different levels: 
• At the source-code level, as asource-to-source transformation. 
• As part of compilation, by extending a compiler to use its intermediate representa-
tions for the purpose of determining where to introduce instrumentation instruc-
tions. 
• As an object-code-level transformation, by modifying object-code files (such as 
UNIX a. o) 
• As apost-loader transformation, by modifying executable files (such as UNIX a. out 
files) 
Currently, code coverage could only be achieved by instrumenting the target program. 
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And the runtime overhead incurred by the instrumented code is tremendous. There are 
lots of instrumentation technique available trying to reduce the runtime overhead. 
Kalyan-Ram Chilakamarri and Sebastian Elbaum [15] proposed a way to instrument 
target program with disposable instrumentation. The idea behind disposable instru-
mentation is to reduce coverage collection overhead by moving instrumentation probes 
after they have been executed. Since coverage measures only require to know whether an 
entity is executed, coverage probes can be removed after the first time their correspond-
ing entity is exercised without loss of information. In spite of the benefits of dynamic 
instrumentation to reduce the runtime overhead, its application remains challenged in 
at least two aspects. First, it requires for the target program to be stopped, rebuilt, and 
re-executed which might overshadow the gains by dynamic instrumentation. Second, it 
cannot take advantage of multiple instances of the program that may run in parallel. 
Regarding to two challenges, [15] proposed two solutions. The first called local disposal 
disposes of each coverage probe H in P as soon as H is executed, without requiring for P 
to stop. The second called collective disposal adds a cooperative flavor to local disposal 
by disposing of probes executed by any deployed instance of P. Thomas Ball and James 
Larus [10] made use of spanning trees for control flow graph (CFG) to reduce the number 
of places in which instrumented code is added. Tikir et al. [54] used instrumentation 
to identify the parts of the program that did or did not execute. They use a Boolean 
valued flag to determine part of the program has executed or not. 
Another way to reduce the overhead of instrumented program is instrumentation 
sampling. Arnold and Ryder [9] giveaway which reduces the runtime overhead by 
make the instrumentation code runs periodically not always. They put a sampling rate 
to duplicated code, which controls the overhead and precision of the instrumentation. 
Instrumentation sampling is very effective for loop-intensive program. 
A third approach is selective instrumentation. This allows user to choose which 
part of the program is instrumented. Rational Purify Plus [3] includes a set of tools 
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for program analysis which are based on code instrumentation. They leverage selective 
instrumentation at module level. Ding and Zhong [31] used selective instrumentation 
to monitor data access in applications in which complete monitoring is not necessary. 
They developed asource-to-source compiler that chooses what data to monitor and at 
which points in the program. London et al. [42] created a tool, called ATAC that 
allows performing selective instrumentation for code coverage. However selective instru-
mentation is only provided at file level. Sameer Shende et al. [52] also used selective 
instrumentation in order to meet requirements on runtime overhead. They performed 
instrumentation to evaluate execution time on functions. 
Sergio W. Ferrero [34] developed a tool called I4CC to combine selective instru-
mentation and instrumentation sampling. I4CC supports block level instrumentation. 
For each compilation unit, the Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) is retrieved and user could 
choose which block should be instrumented. I4CC gives user a flexibility to use cer-
tain sampling rate when the program executes loops. And it is possible to adjust this 
sampling rate based on online feedback from the instrumented program. More specifi-
cally, the iteration number of a loop can be queried in order to decide whether to record 
data or not. With these flexibility, user could guide runtime data collection through the 
development and inclusion of rules into the program. Through the rules the user will 
specify what data should be collected, as well as to when and where. The rules can 
be specified at any place in the AST. As we mentioned earlier, I4CC like other code 
coverage tools, still suffers the overhead incurred by the instrumentation code. 
There are a lot of commercial and freely available tools that help to collect coverage 
data. For example, Clover [13], PureCoverage [3], and Jcoverage [44] are some of the 
most popular commercial tools, while Emma [35], JVMDI [29], and GroboCodeCover-
age [6] are some of the open-source coverage tools. BullseyeCoverage [1] and Semantic 
Designs [4] claim their coverage tools have very low overhead (around 20°0) . An exten-
sion of the proposed model is being implemented in order to reduce the overhead. Once 
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completed the overhead should be comparably low. A feasibility study has been done 
and results show that the overhead can be reduced to similar low levels while maintain-
ing the flexibility of the current approach. The main contribution of this work is the 
introduction of rules to allow the user to control runtime data collection. 
2.2.2 Our Proposed Solution for SQL Stored Procedure 
What we found from previous research and current code coverage tools is that most 
of techniques can not be applied to SQL stored procedure. As stored procedure resides 
in the database server side and it is interpreted to execute, it is a common sense that 
complex business logic and computation-intensive operations should be put into stored 
procedure. So some instrumentation techniques may not be feasible for stored procedure, 
as the effort which is put to reduce the overhead of instrumentation code could be 
counteracted by their own runtime. In our proposed solution, we give user the flexibility 
to select in which database instance and which stored procedure should be instrumented 
and whether Decision/condition coverage should be taken into consideration. Our design 
is based on the following two assumptions: 
• As we mentioned earlier, it is not encouraged to put complex logic into stored 
procedure. And the major part of total runtime is consumed by data access and 
retrieval in database, while the code interpretation time and data collection time 
is comparably less. For example, a common use for stored procedure is to retrieve 
records from a very large table and process each record and then write the updates 
into the database. In this example, processing the records usually costs less time 
than reading and writing them. 
• Compared to time savings, user should be more interested in detailed coverage 
information. That is the reason why we do not use dynamic instrumentation which 
would fail to get how many times each block is covered. Even if user consider 
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running time is more important, with our tool user could choose which stored 
procedure to instrument. 
In our solution, we choose selective instrumentation and use a independent database 
instance to receive coverage data. As data collection is done in database, we could lever-
age the database performance tuning technique to reduce the overhead incurred by I/O 
operation. In the next section, we will talk about the architecture and implementation 
of our tool. 
2.3 Architecture and Implementation 
Figure 2.3 shows the architecture of our tool. This tool basically can be divided into 
two layers. In the first layer, stored procedures which resides in the target database are 
retrieved and instrumented as configured in the configuration XML file. After each run of 
the stored procedure, coverage data are collected, processed and stored into the analysis 
database. The coverage analyzing module is used to process data and store the data in 
certain format in order to make the frontend retrieve data in a more efficient fashion. 
During the process of data collection, certain database performance tuning technique 
is employed to explore more efficiency. We used ASP.net and Internet Explorer as our 
front end. It allows user to view the data by keep drilling down along each database 
instance. We will talk more about the front end in the following section. 
Figure 2.4 shows the complete logic process. As opposed to figure 2.3, in figure 2.4, 
the architecture is more modularized. The SP Processor component which is imple-
mented in CoverageProcessor.exe has two modules. And the Coverage Analyzer Com-
ponent which is implemented in CoverageAnalyzer.exe has two modules too. Our system 
is designed in two layers in order to achieve efficiency, extensibility and flexibility. We 
have all the probes ready to instrument the target stored procedure, and user could 
further add more probes to collect more data. The raw data we collect for each test run 
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Figure 2.3 File Components 
could be used by coverage analyzer to calculate different coverage metrics. The coverage 
analyzer could be customized by user to organize data in different format. During each 
test run of the stored procedures, we only record necessary data and we do not process 
that. The coverage data are only be processed when user want to view the results. 
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In the following subsections, we will talk about each components of our architecture. 
2.3.1 Configuration Information 
We put all configuration information into an XML file. As indicated in Code 1, in this 
XML file, we could specify multiple database instances to instrument and test. In line 3, 
the build name for the database is not mandatory and this information is only used when 
generating coverage report. In line 4, the <InstrumentAres> means whether we need to 
cover inter-procedure call. For each database instance, we need to specify the user name 
and password in order to get corresponding privilege. And <ExcludeItem> tag allows 
user to enumerate all the stored procedure in current database instance. Right now, we 
do not cover system stored procedure. For complete reference of the XML, please refer 
to the schema file. 
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l.G?xml version=" 1.0" encoding=" utf-8" ?> 
2. <SglAnalyzerConfig xmins=" http://schemas" > 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
<BuildName>Test</BuildName> 
<InstrumentAres>true</InstrumentAres> 
<Database> 
GName>AdventureWorks</Name> 
<Server>IocalhostG/Server> 
<UserName>kwei</UserName> 
<UserPassword> 123456G/UserPassword> 
<Excludeltem> 
<Item>dbo.GetBominfo</Item> 
</Excludeltem> 
</Database> 
14.</SglAnalyzerConfig> 
Code 1. Configuration XML File 
2.3.2 Stored Procedure Processor 
The stored procedure processor is the most important component in our tool. This 
component is comprised of two modules. The first module is responsible to retrieve all 
user defined stored procedure and then, feed them into the other module which is re-
sponsible to instrument the stored procedure and put back into the database, replacing 
the original ones with the instrumented ones. At the same time, the stored procedure 
processor also creates some extra stored procedure which is supposed to be instrumented 
into the target stored procedure. Table 2.3.2 shows the main stored procedures added by 
the processor. All the stored procedures are almost same, in which they take a unique 
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id which represents only one specified basic block and database name. Figure 2.5 shows 
the work flow of the stored procedure processor. 
Table 2.1 Populated Stored Procedures 
Stored Procedure Description 
_cc_LogBlock 
_cc_LogArc 
_cc_InsertArcInfo 
_cc_InsertBlockInfo 
Log block related information 
Log inter-procedure call related information 
Insert arc related static information 
Insert block related static information 
The first module in fact is a stored procedure parser. It takes the definition of each 
stored procedure and extracts the abstract syntax tree (AST) and passes it to the next 
module for further process. 
Once the second module gets the abstract syntax tree (AST) from the first module, 
it will do a depth-first traversal of the AST and for each basic block, it will populate 
corresponding static block information to the tables in the analysis database. Code 2 
and 3 show an example stored procedure before and after instrumentation. 
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1. CREATE PROCEDURE PRINT_STATEMENT @EMPLOYEEID INT, @DATE DATETIME 
2. WITH EXECUTE AS CALLER 
3. AS 
4. BEGIN 
5. DECLARE @INDEX INT 
6. DECLARE @ACCOUNTNAME VARCHAR(100) 
7. DECLARE @DESCRIPTION VARCHAR(200) 
8. SELECT @ACCOUNTNAME=ACCOUNTNAME FROM EMPLOYEE_INFO WHERE EMPLOYEEID=@EMPLOYEEID 
9. SELECT @INDEX=30 
10. WHILE @INDEX>=0 
11. BEGIN 
12. SELECT @DESCRIPTION=DESCRIPTION FROM STATEMENTS WHERE ACCOUNTNAME=@ACCOUNTNAME 
AND DATE=@DATE 
13. IF(@DESCRIPTION IS NULL) 
14. ERRORLOG 'Description Unavailable' 
15. ELSE 
16. PROCESS @DESCRIPTON, @INDEX 
17. PRINT 'SUCCESSFULL' 
18. END 
19. UPDATE EMPLOYEE_INFO SET VIEWED=1 WHERE EMPLOYEEID=@EMPLOYEEID 
20. END 
Code 2. Example Stored Procedure Before Instrumentation 
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1. CREATE PROCEDURE PRINT_STATEMENT @EMPLOYEEID INT, @DATE DATETIME 
2. WITH EXECUTE AS CALLER 
3. AS 
4. BEGIN 
5. BEGIN 
6. _cc_IogBlock '2ebce38b—e666-4687-96ee-7e37e900738d','PRINT_STATEMENT','BLOCK_1' 
7. DECLARE @INDEX INT 
8. DECLARE @ACCOUNTNAME VARCHAR(100) 
9. DECLARE @DESCRIPTION VARCHAR(200) 
10. SELECT @ACCOUNTNAME=ACCOUNTNAME FROM EMPLOYEE_INFO WHERE EMPLOYEEID=@EMPLOYEEID 
11. SELECT @INDEX=30 
12. WHILE @INDEX>=0 
13. BEGIN 
14. _cc_IogBlock '23bce38b—e666-4387-36ee-7e37e900738d','PRINT_STATEMENT','BLOCK_2' 
15. SELECT @DESCRIPTION=DESCRIPTION FROM STATEMENTS WHERE ACCOUNTNAME=@ACCOUNTNAME 
AND DATE=@DATE 
16. IF(@DESCRIPTION IS NULL) 
17. BEGIN 
18. _cc_IogBlock '2edce386—e577-4687-96ee-7e37e903738d','PRINT_STATEMENT','BLOCK_3' 
19. ERRORLOG 'Description Unavailable' 
20. END 
21. ELSE 
22. BEGIN 
23. _cc_IogBlock '2abce34b—e6d6-4357-96e3-7e37e900383d','PRINT_STATEMENT','BLOCK_4' 
24. PROCESS @DESCRIPTON, @INDEX 
25. PRINT 'SUCCESSFULL' 
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26. END 
27. END 
28. _cc_IogBlock '2ebc3a3b—e666-1234-96ee-7e37e994738d','PRINT_STATEMENT','BLOCK_5' 
29. UPDATE EMPLOYEE_INFO SET VIEWED=1 WHERE EMPLOYEEID=@EMPLOYEEID 
30. END 
Code 3. Example Stored Procedure After Instrumentation 
Code 2 has a stored procedure with simple control flow. Code 3 is the code after being 
instrumented. We could see that at the beginning of each basic block, there is another 
stored procedure is called which we have already mentioned in the previous part. Those 
stored procedures are used to record the coverage data. During the instrumentation, 
each basic block will be assigned a unique id as the primary key in a table. Also the 
name of the stored procedure the block resides and the sequence number of the block in 
current stored procedure will be passed in those stored procedure. 
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Figure 2.6 Stored Procedure Analyzer 
2.3.3 Stored Procedure Analyzer 
Figure 2.6 shows that in the analyzer module, the raw coverage data are retrieved 
from analysis database first and then calculated into certain coverage metrics. Once the 
processing of data is over, the results are ready to be shown to the user. 
2.3.4 Analysis Database 
The analysis database stores raw coverage data, and after the test run, all coverage 
data will be processed and stored back into the analysis database. This analysis database 
contains tables which are used to hold all the data. Performance tuning techniques are 
applied such as index and primary key constraints etc.. In this paper, we won't list all 
the tables defined in analysis database. User could visit http://public.iastate.edu/ weike 
to get the definition and detailed manual for setting up the database. 
2.3.5 User Frontend 
We used Microsoft ASP.net as our front end. Once coverage data is available to view, 
user could run a script which will deploy the environment automatically and brought 
up an Internet Explorer. The frontend allows user to view the coverage data in a drill 
down fashion. As shown in figure 1, the report give user an overview of the coverage 
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Figure 2.8 Coverage Details in each Build 
results. This results include how many stored procedures, the number of basic blocks, the 
number of arcs, block related information, and arc related information. By clicking the 
details super link, user could drill down to per database level. In this level, all the stored 
procedures which are involved during the execution will be shown in the list. As shown 
in figure 2, it is almost the same with the previous level. The list has the information 
about the blocks, arcs, percentage of coverage and so on. User could keep drilling down 
to each stored procedure shown in figure 3. It shows in this stored procedure which 
part of code is executed by highlighting. From this process, we could view the results 
from overall databases to specific stored procedures. It is extremely useful when inter-
database stored procedure call is made. For Decision/condition coverage, we have a 
table to record all the evaluation 
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Figure 2.9 Coverage Details in each Database Instance 
2.4 Prototype Evaluation 
The application of our tool is code testing, in which code coverage results can be used 
to analyze coverage of each of the test cases. We used a database from a company as our 
test bed to evaluate this tool. This database contains 68 tables, 18 stored procedures 
and 10 functions. We will focus on one stored procedure called uspEmployeelnfoToDate 
which is responsible to find an employee according to his/her employee id and update 
its employee information. The completion of this stored procedure includes a query on 
a table called Employee which has more than 5000 rows with employee id as its primary 
key, some update operation on table Department and BillOfMaterials if this employee 
belong to certain group, and insertion on several tables. Our test runs on a Pentium 
PIV at 2.4GHz with 1GB of RAM. The tool runs under Windows XP and Microsoft 
SQL Server 2005. 
In the previous section, we could see the results from the user front end snapshot. 
Here, we will present the running time for uspEmployeelnfoToDate and other stored 
procedure it calls. We calculate the results by running the stored procedure 50 times and 
averaging them. As in database, consecutively running the same query is meaningless, 
because database will keep the cache for you. In order to make our test run more 
accurate, we will remove the cache after each run. The results are shown in table 
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~. Coverage for Stored Procedtue ~~ ~~ ~~ 
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Figure 2.10 Coverage Details in each Stored Procedure 
2.2. From the results we could see the overhead is reasonable compared to the overall 
runtime. The reason why the overhead is not so significant as it is in C and Java is the 
run time of stored procedure is mainly consumed by data manipulation, and the control 
flow in stored procedure would not be as complex as it is in C and Java. But we do not 
exclude the possibility that some stored procedure contains complex control flow and 
it is computation intensive. Recently, database renders like Oracle and Microsoft offers 
more programmability for stored procedure which is called extended stored procedure. 
The extended stored procedure is written in other language, C, Java or C#. In our 
paper, we assume that the pure SQL stored procedure is not computation intensive. 
This is proved in the stored procedure uspPrintError which is responsible to print error 
message without any data manipulation. Its run time is less than 1 ms, while the run 
time after instrumentation is 3 ms. As in the stored procedure, the probes are supposed 
to stored the coverage data into certain tables which consumes more time than printing 
error messages. 
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Table 2.2 Running Results (Run Time in ms) 
Stored Procedure Before Instr After Instr Blocks Covered 
uspEmployeeInfoToDate 2,700 3,143 100°0 
uspGetBillOfMaterial 775 821 100°0 
uspGetEmployeeManagers 648 710 100°0 
uspGetManagerEmployees 573 627 100°0 
uspGetWhereUsedProductID 437 498 100°0 
uspPrintError < 1 3 100°0 
We could see the results are satisfying, but we still need to find a large database 
repository to verify our results. As far as we see, our tool could be applied to industry 
products. It is easy to deploy and easy to use. The front end is very straightforward 
and meaningful. 
2.5 Future Work 
Although our implementation has been successfully used in the analysis of complex 
industry standard designs, there are still certain improvements required before an ef-
ficient tool could be created. In the future, we will improve this tool in the following 
aspects: 
• Provide user more flexibility of per —block instrumentation. Instrumentation should 
be based on abstract syntax tree (AST) of each stored procedure. 
• Come up with a smart way to handle recursion which will definitely bring more 
overhead. Although recursion is not recommended in stored procedure, it does 
exist from a syntax point of view. 
• We will continue our evaluation in a larger setting, with a large database to verify 
if our findings still hold for large-scale industry database environment. 
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2.6 Conclusion 
We have presented and quantified a new approach for stored procedure code coverage 
which is never been studied before. Code coverage is very important for code test. As 
code coverage can highlight missing test cases and possible bugs, it is incorporated into 
many verification methodologies. Recently, database techniques play an important role 
in today's application system. SQL stored procedures make SQL more programmable 
and operational. But there is no code coverage tools for stored procedures in the market. 
In this paper, we introduced a tool we developed for stored procedure. As constrained by 
the programmability and performance issues, we designed a novel architecture and cov-
erage data collection method for stored procedure. This architecture is multiple-layered 
and flexible for coverage data collection and data processing for different coverage met-
rics. The report generated for user has detailed information for each database instance 
which contains percentage for coverage of each stored procedure and highlighted code 
which is executed during each test run. And for each decision, we keep the value and 
which branch it takes. 
In our design of instrumentation schema, we choose selective instrumentation which 
is more efficient for stored procedure. This tool is really easy to use and deploy. And 
overhead is low and acceptable compared to the runtime of the stored procedure. It has 
the potential to be applied in the real test cycle and definitely contributes its value. 
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